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In recent years, students of world politics have been shaken to the core by the ascent of post-truth politics, which is a particu-
lar style of ‘doing politics’ by politicians and pundits – a style that strategically relies on misrepresentations at best, and at
worst, lies. The so-called post-truth world has had consequences beyond those who are in the business of doing politics. The
pervasiveness of presumed causal linkages between environmental degradation, violent conflict and human mobility has been
utilized by policy makers and pundits to shape public opinion about the predicament of the Syrian refugees, the human tra-
gedy of this decade in the Northern hemisphere. On the one hand, scholarly research shows that the relationship between
environmental degradation, violent conflict and irregular mobility is far too complex to be understood in terms of causal link-
ages. On the other hand, in a post-truth world, it is politicians and pundits who repeat falsehoods that have shaped public
opinion about the Syrian refugees. It is in the spirit of engaging with post-truth politics as such that I present what follows as
a primer: how not to think about human mobility and the global environment.
Post-truth has been declared as word of the year by Oxford
English Dictionaries (OED, the qualifier ‘in the English-speak-
ing world’ is implied but not always spelled out). Here is
how OED defines post-truth:
relating to or denoting circumstances in which
objective facts are less influential in shaping public
opinion than appeals to emotion and personal
belief (OED 2016).
Post-truth politics is a particular style of ‘doing politics’ by
politicians and pundits – a style that strategically relies on
misrepresentations at best, and at worst, lies. Finally, post-
truth world is a state in which ‘blatant lies’ become ‘routine
across the society’, the implication being that ‘politicians
can lie without condemnation’ (Higgins 2016: 9).
According to philosopher Katherine Higgins, it is impor-
tant to distinguish the rise of a post-truth world from every-
day practices of politicians and pundits who may be
economical with the truth or bend it as they see fit. Higgins
writes:
This is different from the cliche that all politicians
lie and make promises they have no intention of
keeping – this still expects honesty to be the
default position. In a post-truth world, this expecta-
tion no longer holds (Higgins 2016: 9).
Ironically, notes Higgins, ‘politicians who benefit from post-
truth tendencies rely on truth, too’. This is ‘not because they
adhere to it’. Rather, politicians who bend the truth also ‘de-
pend on most people’s good-natured tendency to trust that
others are telling the truth, at least the vast majority of the
time’ (Higgins 2016: 9).
Yet, such irony offers little reprieve for the students of
world politics who are shaken to the core by the ascent of
post-truth politics. For, the post-truth world has had conse-
quences beyond those who are in the business of doing
politics. The pervasiveness of presumed causal linkages
between environmental degradation, violent conflict and
human mobility has been utilized by policy makers and
pundits to shape public opinion about the predicament of
refugees in general and the Syrian refugees in particular.
Such utilization of presumed linkages by policy makers and
pundits have imposed limits on potential policy responses,
thereby worsening the predicament of Syrians on the move
from their temporary abode in Jordan, Lebanon or Turkey to
somewhere in Western Europe or beyond. On the one hand,
scholarly research shows that the relationship between envi-
ronmental degradation, violent conflict and irregular mobil-
ity is far too complex to be understood in terms of causal
linkages. On the other hand, in a post-truth world, it is
politicians and pundits who repeat falsehoods that have
shaped public opinion about the Syrian refugees, our under-
standing of their reasons for leaving home, and the poten-
tial implications of their arrival for the threat of so-called
homegrown terrorism. As such, people’s responsiveness to
humanitarian calls for offering sanctuary to Syrian refugees
was limited. Not surprisingly, the calls for going beyond
mere humanitarian action were drowned out.
The point being that resisting post-truth politics, as it has
shaped policy making vis-a-vis human mobility and the
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global environment, is a must for students of world politics
seeking to inform policies vis-a-vis human mobility in gen-
eral and the Syrian refugees in particular. After all, even
those who are somewhat more skeptical about ‘people’s
good-natured tendency to trust that others are telling the
truth’ nevertheless rely on the public’s receptiveness to the
force of the better argument as they call for intellectuals to
‘engage with post-truth politics’ (Tallis 2016). Higgins con-
curs: ‘Scientists and philosophers should be shocked by the
idea of post-truth, and they should speak up when scientific
findings are ignored by those in power or treated as mere
matters of faith’ (Higgins 2016: 9). It is in this spirit of
engaging with post-truth politics as such that I present what
follows as a primer: how not to think about human mobility
and the global environment. The predicament of Syrians on
the move constitutes the human tragedy of this decade in
the Northern hemisphere. Hence my focus on their predica-
ment (along with many of the contributors to this special
issue). Yet the primer below applies to human mobility
beyond the Syrian people’s present-day predicament.
Human mobility is the norm, not the exception
Human beings have been on the move for as long as the
history of humankind. Indeed, it is population movements
that have been the norm throughout history. If it were
not for human mobility, the face of the Australian and
American continents, for instance, would be very different
today. Yet, where politicians and pundits encourage the
public to consider how their polity has recently changed
with the arrival of immigrants, they often overlook the
people flows that have historically shaped their countries
and themselves – especially if their (grand)parents were
immigrants.
Over the years, reasons for human mobility have varied. It
was drought experienced at a catastrophic scale that led
Turkic peoples to move from Central Asia to Anatolia around
the 6th century. A search for religious freedom for some
and escape from famine and poverty for others shaped 17-
19th century human flows from Western Europe to North
America. The rise and fall of empires gave shape to human
mobility in particular ways, as they encouraged the move-
ment of subjects across the imperial realm. Finally, it was a
need for manual labor in Western Europe’s post-Second
World War reconstruction that resulted in the arrival of
so-called guest workers to Germany, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium and Scandinavia.
In the particular case of Syrian refugees, it is important to
note, as Chatty does in this volume, that Syria has been a
‘refuge state’ throughout its modern history. ‘Five times in
modern history Syria and its peoples have received and
accommodated massive influxes of forced migrants’, notes
Chatty. Indeed, it was thanks to Syrian hospitality that a ser-
ies of regional refugee emergencies, some environmental
and others political, were contained within the region.
According to Chatty, ‘the Arab and Syrian institution of hos-
pitality and refuge meant that, until 2011, the international
humanitarian aid regime did not have to deal with mass
influx into Europe of Iraqi or other refugees from the Arab
world’.
Such generous hospitality on the part of Syrians was
returned when, in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, they
had to flee their homes. A majority of those fleeing Syria
were contained within the region, with Lebanon, Jordan and
Turkey doing the heavy lifting. It was only when Syrian refu-
gees began to outlive their welcome as guests (for, they are
not always accorded refugee status) and the lack of proper
schooling facilities in their temporary abode became unen-
durable that they turned to Western Europe and North
America ‘for opportunities to save their youth from becom-
ing ‘a lost generation’ and possible radicalization in the
region’. Still, Chatty insists, mobility and not a search for per-
manent residence has been the norm for Syrian refugees
throughout this period, with many refugees expressing their
wish to return to Syria once it becomes safer to do so.
What renders the current situation a ‘crisis’ is our
response, not the event
In the past few years, it has become a commonplace to
characterize the arrival of Syrian refugees by boats or on
foot at the borders of the European Union as a crisis. Invari-
ably referred to as the ‘refugee crisis’, ‘migrant crisis’ or
‘Mediterranean refugee crisis’, the arrival of Syrian refugees
has become a cause for alarm in European Union circles.
Yet, as Pallister-Wilkins, following political theorist Craig Cal-
houn, underscores (in this volume):
crises are very rarely sudden or unforeseen events.
Instead they are brought about by what the
humanitarian organization MSF [Medecins Sans
Frontieres] terms a ‘failure of politics’.
For instance, what rendered the Cuban missile crisis a crisis
and not a foreign policy problem was not the mere pres-
ence of Soviet Union missiles within striking distance of the
US mainland. For, the Soviets had acquired that capability
some time ago. Accordingly, their placement or removal did
not alter the balance of power between the two superpow-
ers – not in material terms. It was the fact that the Soviets
had dared to enter what the US considered its own back-
yard, thereby challenging US identity as the defender of the
so-called free world. As such, it was not the materiality of
missiles but the meaning attached to them that rendered
the placement of missiles in Cuba a crisis, empowering
those who called for their removal (Weldes 1996).
Accordingly, labeling the latest set of events surrounding
the Syrian refugees a crisis empowers those who are calling
for instant policy-responses: either in humanitarian terms in
the forms of rescue operations, or in militarized terms, in
the form of stricter border controls. Either way, concludes
Pallister-Wilkins,
the framing of current events in the Mediterranean
and elsewhere in terms of individualized tragedies
and the mobilization of ‘crisis’ enacts particular, lim-
ited, responses that simultaneously perform
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processes of humanitarian rescue and sovereign
capture.
For, crises are popularly understood to demand immedi-
ate policy responses, leaving little room for political
deliberations, as Bettini underscores in this volume. How-
ever, inquiring into the history of Euro-Mediterranean rela-
tions reveals the politics of what is popularly presented as a
crisis.
• If we take the end of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(mid-2000s) as the beginning of the unfolding of events,
this is a crisis that has been in the making for almost a
decade. Indeed, for the Mediterranean-littoral members
of the European Union, the so-called refugee crisis has
been a fact of life since the 1990s. Spain, Italy and Greece
have been active in shaping EU policies toward managing
human mobility at EU borders, in the face of an increas-
ing number of arrivals from countries to the south and
east of the Mediterranean. Yet, they did not always suc-
ceed in getting their Northern European counterparts to
see the human tragedy.
• If we take the European Community’s initial diagnosis of
its Mediterranean problem as the beginning of today’s
situation, this is a crisis that has been in the making since
the mid-1970s (for almost 40 years). Indeed, the European
Union’s precursor, European Community (EC) was among
the first to diagnose persistent insecurities in the Mediter-
ranean. They did so during the 1970s, when EC policy
makers adopted a new and coordinated policy toward
the Near East and North Africa, that is, those parts of the
Middle East that are geographically closer to the Euro-
pean continent, and designed the Euro-Mediterranean
partnership (the so-called Barcelona process) as a solution
(Bilgin 2004).
Whichever date we take as the beginning, then, what is
difficult to deny is that what we are experiencing is not a
crisis that has emerged out of the blue. It has been in
the making for a long time. Furthermore, focusing on the
influx of refugees as a problem for the EU alone, does
not allow considering the crux of the problem for those
who are on the move: persistent insecurities experienced
in sending countries. Put differently, what we are currently
experiencing is not a crisis that has suddenly emerged,
but the culmination of a series of policy (mis)steps that
prioritized stopping human mobility, and not understand-
ing and addressing the structural violence shaping such
mobility (see also: Bank, Fr€ohlich and Schneiker, this
volume).
There are no scholarly proven causal linkages
between environmental degradation, violent
conflict and human mobility
In present-day debates, we come across all-too-easy expla-
nations about the dynamics behind human mobility. For
some, human mobility is shaped by individuals’ desire to
seek better life chances; that is, mobility is mostly if not
purely voluntary. Such explanations often underestimate the
violence experienced by those on the move (see Bank,
Fr€ohlich and Schneiker, this volume). For others, human
mobility is about escaping (structural) violence either politi-
cally or environmentally caused.
In an attempt to link the plight of Syrian refugees with
environmental degradation, some politicians and pundits
have offered presumed links of causality: environmental
degradation causing violence, which then results in forced
migration. While there certainly are links between these
three phenomena, notes Myrttinen in this volume, ‘the links
are not simple and straight-forward’. Indeed, all contributors
to this volume join in underscoring that there are no schol-
arly-proven causal linkages between environmental degrada-
tion, violent conflict and human mobility. Astonishingly,
however, in a post-truth world, we got used to hearing
some politicians and pundits make such claims without
offering much in the form of evidence: ‘climate change
leads to conflict, conflict leads to extremism, and this leads
to migration’. Such unfounded claims, then, allow them to
make a further claim linking migration and terrorism,
thereby privileging militarized responses while marginalizing
calls for humanitarian action.
Bank, Fr€ohlich and Schneiker’s contribution to this volume
debunk such claims by offering a counterintuitive argument
about the relationship between human mobility and vio-
lence: that (1) human mobility could be an escape from vio-
lence, (2) a process of violence in itself, and (3) a path into
physical and structural violence. It is often the physical part
of the third and sometimes the first dimension of this rela-
tionship that is considered in everyday debates in our
post-truth world (i.e. human mobility as causing violent
extremism, or human mobility as an escape from violent
extremism). What is needed, argue Bank, Fr€ohlich and
Schneiker, is a ‘holistic understanding of the complex
migration-violence nexus’. They write:
The common assumption that the violence ends in
the moment that a migrant reaches a place which
is not considered ‘at war’, ‘under siege’ or ‘in dis-
tress’ urgently needs to be revised. For instance,
while refugee camps can certainly provide safe
havens for human beings trying to get away from
violence, they may just as well reproduce old or
create new patterns of violence. They may also pro-
tect some and at the same time expose others to
violence.
A case at hand is the experiences of women and young
girls fleeing Syria. According to reports on the refugees in
Turkey, Jordan, Libya and Lebanon women often find life
inside camps suffocating due to demands made on them
for marrying older men.1 Yet, those who forego the security
of the camps have to make their own way amid uncertain-
ties and demands made on them by their network of rela-
tives or acquaintances. Such demands come from their own
families, who seek to ease their financial burden, or see
marrying off their daughters as ‘second wives’ as a way of
managing the potential risk of violence. While polygamy is
Global Policy (2017) 8:Suppl.1 © 2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Resisting Post-truth Politics, a Primer 57
not allowed in many of the aforementioned countries, it is
nevertheless known to persist in some remote areas. Giving
in to such demands for becoming ‘second wives’ results in
an array of insecurities for women (or children, for some
are as young as 12). What is more, insecurities experienced
by the ‘first wives’ remain yet another dimension of this
tangled web of relationships between human mobility and
violence.2
Gender is a key factor, but not the way you think
Some politicians and pundits in the EU and US have made
the case against receiving Syrian refugees by tapping partic-
ular portrayals of women’s rights in Islam. They suggested
that bringing in Syrian refugees is likely to endanger women
at home by virtue of refugee men having little respect for
women due to their presumed cultural conditioning. In a
post-truth world, it is difficult to check the veracity of claims
regarding acts of violence conducted by refugee men
against women of the host countries. For, rampant portray-
als of docile Muslim women and hyper-aggressive Muslim
men color the lenses through which Syrian refugees are
viewed, as Rothe has shown. Furthermore, as Myrttinen has
argued, such gendered representations are by no means
exceptional to Syrian refugees in the US and EU, but can
also be observed elsewhere in the world.
That said, while it is difficult to check the veracity of
claims regarding acts of violence conducted by refugee men
against women in host societies, what is not difficult is to
check is the status of women in pre-war Syria. For, before
2011, women in Syria enjoyed a degree of freedom that is
not always seen in some of its neighboring countries.
Women’s level of education was high and their participation
in public life went beyond schools and included working
outside the home. The point being that the claimed link
between advocating women’s rights and blocking refugees
from Syria is spurious. There are broader issues at stake,
including gendered stereotypes coloring the hosts’ under-
standing of the behavior and needs of Syrian refugees.
That said it is not only those who seek to block the arrival
of Syrian refugees who rely on gendered stereotypes. Rothe
has shown in this volume that both those who warn against
the security risks generated by refugees (the control dis-
course), and those who consider migration as an adaptation
mechanism (the resilience discourse), understand the rela-
tionship between environmental degradation and mobility
in gendered terms. These two discourses are drawn from
Rothe’s analysis of EU policy reports and publications on the
relationship between climate change, migration and
resilience.
The control discourse seeks to address environmental
degradation, argues Rothe, because its proponents worry
that such degradation, when coupled with demographic
pressure, is likely to generate uncontainable migratory flows.
Such portrayals rely on gendered stereotypes of hyper-fem-
inized women who are a part of the problem by virtue of
their ‘irresponsible’ reproductive behavior, and hyper-mascu-
linized men who seek to make up for their ‘infantilization’
by contributing to feeding the demographic trends. Overall,
this is a paternalistic reading of the problem of environmen-
tal degradation, where the South is portrayed as entirely
responsible for its environment-related problems and the
North’s role is portrayed as limited to ‘measuring’, ‘calculat-
ing’ and ‘visualizing’ ‘security risks’.
The resilience discourse views migration in positive terms,
as an adaptation mechanism. Communities respond to envi-
ronmental degradation by sending some of their members
to lands far away, it is argued, as part of an attempt to sur-
vive under the new circumstances. Those who migrate
(often men) help to lessen the demographic pressure at
home by sending remittances and by acquiring otherwise
unavailable cultural and economic capital. Those who stay
behind (often women) find resourceful ways of coping with
the new circumstances. While framing women’s roles in pos-
itive terms, the resilience discourse, too, relies on gendered
stereotypes, argues Rothe, by way of portraying women as
enjoying ‘a special relationship with nature’.
In the specific context of Syrian refugees, underscoring
the resilience of Syrian peoples in general and Middle East-
ern societies in particular marks a positive shift away from
portraying human mobility as a threat, toward viewing refu-
gees as resilient agents of their own destiny. However, as
Rothe underscores, women are viewed in gendered terms
all the same: either as perpetrators of the problem of
uncontrolled population increase; or as a key part of the
solution by virtue of their presumed ‘special relationship
with nature’. My point being that gender is a key factor
shaping the relationship between human mobility, environ-
mental degradation and violence, but not the way you
think!
Conclusion
Some policy makers and pundits’ present day portrayals of
human mobility as a threat to security are reminiscent of
immediate post-Cold War fear-mongering about a coming
‘clash of civilizations’ as suggested by Samuel P. Hunting-
ton (1993). Scholarly studies on the relationship between
(presumed) civilizational differences and (violent) conflict
found the relationship to be weak at best, and at worst,
spurious (Chiozza 2002; Fox 2002; Henderson 2005; Hen-
derson and Tucker 2001; Russett et al. 2000). Yet, the civi-
lizational clash scenario enjoyed staying power in policy
discourse, being taken up by politicians and pundits who
do not always rely on evidence in making claims in a
post-truth world.
The risk we are faced with is that our understanding of
the relationship between human mobility and environmen-
tal degradation could be heading in the same direction
insofar as post-truth world assumptions about refugees
causing insecurity are allowed to shape policy debates,
thereby leaving little room for politics. The point being that
‘reducing politics to policy’ (Bettini, this volume) is not likely
to get us far in a post-truth world. We need debates on the
politics behind policy options and their limitations – debates
that are informed by ‘facts’ and ‘truths’. It is in the spirit of
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resisting the forces of post-truth politics that shape our
understandings of and responses to the predicament of Syr-
ian refugees that I offered the foregoing discussion in the
form of a primer: how not to think about human mobility
and environmental degradation.
Notes
1. Needless to say, such practices are not isolated to Turkey. On Jordan,
Libya and Lebanon, see, for example: Karasapan (2015).
2. ‘Suriyeli kız cocukları imam nikâhıyla kuma yapılıyor’ [online]. Avail-
able from: https://t24.com.tr/haber/suriyeli-kiz-cocuklari-imam-nika
hiyla-kuma-yapiliyor,320210. [Accessed 7 December 2016].
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